MuscleMeat

Russische Federatie

Bezoekers in dit topic

Weinig nieuws over Vlad de laatste tijd zeker? Opvallend :thinking:
 
“15 gevaarlijke Russische spionnen hadden basiskamp in de Franse Alpen”
Vijftien gevaarlijke Russische spionnen die de Franse Alpen gebruiken als uitvalsbasis voor operaties in heel Europa. Het lijkt het verhaal van één of andere spannende spionagethriller, maar volgens de Franse krant Le Monde is het realiteit. De praktijken zouden zijn ontdekt door Franse, Britse en Zwitserse contraspionagediensten en hun partners, waaronder ook de Verenigde Staten. De bal ging aan het rollen na de vergiftiging van dubbelspion Sergej Skripal vorig jaar in het Verenigd Koninkrijk.

Le Monde meldt dat de 15 spionnen allemaal officieren van de Russische militaire inlichtingendiensten (GROe) zijn, gespecialiseerd in onder meer moorden. Sinds 2014 circuleren ze in Europa. Hun laatste passage in Frankrijk zou dateren van september 2018.

De spionnen behoren tot de eenheid 29155 van het 161ste speciaal opleidingscentrum van de GROe. “Deze eenheid houdt zich bezig met moorden, sabotage en meer heimelijke taken zoals het beheer van ‘dode brievenbussen’, de geheime manier van informatieuitwisseling die spionnen gebruiken”, aldus de krant.

Volgens Le Monde hebben de Russische officieren verschillende keren in kleine plaatsen zoals Annemasse, Chamonix of Evian verbleven. Ze hebben geen operaties uitgevoerd in Frankrijk, maar wel in Groot-Brittannië, in Bulgarije, op de Krim, in Moldavië en in Montenegro. De Franse inlichtingendiensten gaan er dan ook van uit dat het departement Haute-Savoie, dat aan de grens ligt met Zwitserland en Italië, door de Russen enkel gebruikt werd als uitvalsbasis voor alle illegale operaties van eenheid 29155 in Europa.

Er werden geen wapens of materiaal in beslag genomen en er werden ook nog geen lokale tussenpersonen geïdentificeerd, aldus Le Monde. De officieren hebben klaarblijkelijk geen contact opgenomen met agenten van de Russische ambassade in Parijs.

Een van de bewuste agenten zou door Londen geïdentificeerd zijn als een van de drie daders achter de vergiftiging van de Russische dubbelspion Sergej Skripal en zijn dochter Joelia, vorig jaar in het Britse Salisbury. Dat gebeurde met het zenuwgas novitsjok, een uiterst giftig goedje dat stamt uit de tijd van de Sovjet-Unie. Vader en dochter overleefden uiteindelijk de aanslag.

Skripal is een voormalige medewerker van de Russische militaire inlichtingendienst die zo’n 300 Russische spionnen verklikte bij de Britse geheime dienst MI6. Volgens het Verenigd Koninkrijk zitten twee agenten van de Russische dienst achter de aanslag. Het onderzoekscollectief Bellingcat identificeerde ook een derde Russische agent die op dat ogenblik ook in het Verenigd Koninkrijk vertoefde en vermoedelijk betrokken was bij de feiten.

De aanval veroorzaakte een groot diplomatiek incident tussen Moskou en de Europese Unie. De westerse diensten startten daarop een groot onderzoek om de verantwoordelijken op te sporen.

De onthullingen van Le Monde komen er op een moment dat Duitsland Rusland ervan beschuldigt achter de moord op een Georgiër te zitten in augustus in Berlijn. Getuigen van de moord spreken over een echte “executie”.

Op 23 augustus werd een 40-jarige Tsjetsjeense Georgiër op klaarlichte dag in een Berlijns park doodgeschoten met een pistool met geluiddemper. Het slachtoffer werd geïdentificeerd als Zelimkhan Khangochvili, een voormalige Tsjetsjeense militaire bevelhebber die tijdens de Tweede Tsjetsjeense oorlog tegen Rusland vocht.

Meteen daarna werd een verdachte gearresteerd, een 49-jarige Rus genaamd Vadim Sokolov. Hij zit in de cel in Berlijn, maar wil niets zeggen. Vanaf het begin werd Rusland verdacht van betrokkenheid bij de zaak, maar het Kremlin ontkent. “Dit zijn verdenkingen gebaseerd op niets”, zo klinkt het.

Het federale Duitse parket in Karlsruhe, bevoegd voor spionagezaken, heeft vandaag officieel de moordzaak naar zich toegetrokken. Twee medewerkers van de Russische ambassade, die volgens Berlijn niet wilden meewerken aan het onderzoek, moeten meteen het land verlaten.
 
Moscow’s Urban Renewal Budget Equals Rest of Russia’s

1576256416863.png

The city of Moscow spent nearly as much money on urban renewal over the past decade as the rest of the country combined, the Vedomosti business daily reported Friday.

Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin made urbaniztion a top priority when he took office in 2010. In 2015, Sobyanin launched the Moya Ulitsa (My Street) initiative, which calls itself “the largest beautification project in Moscow’s modern history.”

Since 2010, Moscow spent 1.5 trillion rubles ($24 billion) on blagoustroystvo (urban renewal) with new parks, sidewalks and bicycle lanes — while the rest of the country's cities spent 1.7 trillion rubles over the same period.

In the first 10 months of 2019 alone, the capital’s budget for beautification (281 billion rubles) was more than Russia spent on constructing the Crimean bridge and is comparable to the budgets of entire regions like Krasnodar and Tatarstan.

It was the equivalent of 15% of the city's budget and more than it spent on education.

At the same time, Moscow’s income more than doubled over the past decade, from 1.13 trillion rubles in 2011 to 2.8 trillion rubles projected for next year.

7 Things British PM Boris Johnson Has Said About Russia

1576256924678.png

British Prime Minister Boris Johnson's Conservative Party has secured a majority in a landslide election victory, results showed on Friday.

In addition to leading Britain through its withdrawal from the European Union, Johnson will be tasked with navigating British-Russian relations, which have been fraught since Russia annexed Crimea from Ukraine and a former Russian spy was poisoned on British soil.

Prior to Thursday’s victory, Johnson’s opponents accused him of delaying publishing a report on alleged Russian meddling in British politics to hide embarassing revelations about himself and his party.

On interacting with Russia as Foreign Secretary (September 2018)

“When I became foreign secretary I thought there was no objective reason why we should be quite so hostile to Russia.”

“Yes, there were lots of reasons to be suspicious, lots of reasons to be wary. But I thought it was possible — I made the classic, classic mistake of thinking it was possible to have a 'reset' with Russia.”

On President Vladimir Putin (December 2015; June 2019)

“He [Putin] is allegedly the linchpin of a vast post-Soviet gangster kleptocracy, and is personally said to be the richest man on the planet. Journalists who oppose him get shot. His rivals find themselves locked up. Despite looking a bit like Dobby the House Elf, he is a ruthless and manipulative tyrant.”

“I don’t want to put too fine a point on it, Vladimir, but there are some countries where capitalism is believed to be in the hands of oligarchs and cronies, where journalists are shot, and where 'liberal values' are derided, and where according to the Russian statistics agency Rosstat, a third of the country cannot afford to buy more than two pairs of shoes per year; where 12% of the population still has to rely on an outdoor toilet, and where real incomes have declined for each of the past five years.”

“It is a matter of economic fact that, when Vladimir Putin says that liberalism is obsolete, he is talking the most tremendous tripe. Liberalism is alive. It is well. It is delivering prosperity on a scale unimaginable to previous generations.”

On Russian interference in British politics (November 2019)

“There’s absolutely no evidence that I’ve ever seen of any Russian interference in UK democratic processes… And as for that particular report I saw no reason whatever to change to timetable for publication just because there was a general election going on.”

On his attitude toward Russia (December 2019)

“I am a Russophile, a committed Russophile… And I believe — I’m certain that I’m the first foreign secretary in the history of my office to be called Boris.”

On the Skripal poisoning (March 2018)

“No matter how exactly it came to be done, the pathway, the chain of responsibility seems to me to go back to the Russian state and those at the top.”

On Russian oligarch donations to the Conservative Party (November 2019)

"All donations to the Conservative Party are properly vetted, properly publicized. … I'll leave it to your teams of researchers to bring that fact before us. It's all there in the public."

On Russia’s involvement in the Syrian conflict (September 2016)

“The world’s attitude towards Russia has been hardening and I think people now believe that Russia is in danger of becoming a pariah nation… If they continue like this they will forfeit any sympathy and any admiration in the world at all, and I think they do care about that.”
 
Putin Still Uses Obsolete Windows XP, Report Says
Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to still use Microsoft’s discontinued Windows XP operating system, the Open Media news website reported Monday after examining photographs of his desktop.

Microsoft stopped releasing security updates for Windows XP and Office 2003, with occasional exceptions, in April 2014. Russian officials are technically banned from using foreign software as Moscow aims to protect national interests amid fears of foreign espionage and boost Russia’s tech industry.

Windows XP is installed both on Putin’s desktop in the Kremlin and at his official residence Novo-Ogaryovo west of Moscow, Open Media said, citing Kremlin press service photographs published this fall.

Putin avoids smartphones and has long viewed the internet with suspicion.

Windows XP was the last Microsoft operating system certified for use in Russia’s government agencies, according to Defense Ministry export control documents cited by Open Media. Windows 10, it added, received certification only for computers that do not hold state secrets.
Russia planned to replace Microsoft and Apple software with domestic operating systems at all government organizations and “strategic” companies by 2025-2030.

The presidential office was reported to have postponed plans to switch to a Russian-made operating system after it faced setbacks last year. Open Media said it was unable to find the Kremlin’s tender offers for the domestic operating system in the Russian government’s procurement database.

Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov did not explain to Open Media why the Kremlin still has not replaced Putin’s operating system.

Earlier this month, Russia banned the sale of smartphones without Russian-made software and apps starting July 2020. Putin also signed into law measures that would cut off the Russian segment of the internet from the rest of the world when needed.
Sanctions Reduced Inequality in Russia
Sanctions have helped reduce income inequality in Russia, a new study looking into the effects of both Western sanctions against Russia and Russia’s own counter-sanctions has said.

The U.S. and EU imposed sanctions against Russia in 2014 in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for pro-Russian separatists in Eastern Ukraine. In response, Russia introduced counter-sanctions blocking agricultural imports from the West.

The new research, published by the Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT), says that income inequality — as measured by the Gini coefficient — in Russia was lower in 2016 than it would have been in a scenario where Russia was not under sanctions.

Author Gayane Barseghyan said that “smart sanctions” had successfully hit Russia’s wealthiest citizens, while Moscow’s tit-for-tat ban on Western food imports “boosted the domestic agricultural sector, resulting in higher agricultural productivity and farm worker incomes.”

The research highlighted a “decrease after 2013 in the shares of total income and consumption of the richest Russians ... while other groups experienced a relative increase.” As a result, “the sanctions and counter-sanctions programs reduced inequality on average by one percentage point annually,” Barseghyan said.

“This result can be explained by the adverse effects of smart sanctions on top income earners and improvements at the other end of the income distribution due to counter-sanctions leading to expansion of agricultural sector,” she added.

Despite the fall in inequality and agricultural boost, Barseghyan estimated that Russia’s overall GDP per capita was $1,337 per year — around 5% lower — between 2014-2017 as a result of sanctions.
 
Putin’s End-of-Year Press Conference (in quotes)

1576777105299.png


Putin Open to Changing Constitution Amid Succession Question

1576775552532.png

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday he was open to the possibility of altering Russia's constitution, including proposals to increase parliament's power and to limit the number of presidential terms anyone can serve.

The issue of constitutional change in Russia is watched closely amid speculation about Putin's own political ambitions.

In power as either president or prime minister since 1999, Putin, 67, is due to step down in 2024 when his fourth presidential term ends. Under the current constitution, which bans anyone from serving more than two successive presidential terms, Putin is barred from immediately running again.

Critics have accused him of plotting to wield power beyond 2024 however, suggesting he might change the constitution to run again as president, shift power to parliament and assume an enhanced role as prime minister, or head a new union state comprised of Russia and neighbouring Belarus.

Putin on Thursday said he was open to the idea of making constitutional changes when it came to parliamentary powers and the institutions of the presidency and prime minister, but said Russia should tread carefully.

"It's only possible to do this (changes) after thorough preparation and a deep discussion in society. You'd need to be very careful," Putin said at his annual news conference.

He said he was open to tweaking presidential term limits, suggesting they could be changed to limit anyone's ability to serve more than two terms, something he has done.

“One thing that could be changed about these (presidential) terms is removing the clause about 'successive' (terms). Your humble servant served two terms consecutively, then left his post and had the constitutional right to return to the post of president, because these were not two successive terms," he said.

"(This clause) troubles some of our political analysts and public figures. Well, maybe it could be removed."
 
Schoten nabij hoofdkwartier Russische geheime dienst: zeker drie doden

1576774047584.png

Een onbekende heeft volgens Russische media met een kalasjnikov geschoten op mensen in de buurt van het hoofdkwartier van de Russische geheime dienst FSB, in hoofdstad Moskou. Daarbij zouden zeker drie doden zijn gevallen.

Er zijn ook berichten over twee gewonde FSB-medewerkers. De krant Izvestia heeft het over doden onder de ordediensten maar meer details ontbreken nog.

Het is nog onduidelijk of er een of meer schutters waren. De ruime omgeving is afgesloten door de ordediensten. Het is niet de eerste keer dat er doden en gewonden vallen aan het FSB-hoofdkwartier in hartje Moskou.
Het hoofdkwartier is trouwens nog steeds Loebjanka. Jammer zo'n journalist zonder historisch besef.
 

Gunman Opens Fire in Central Moscow, Killing at Least 1 Near FSB Building

1576774788356.png

At least one person has been killed in a shooting in downtown Moscow on Thursday evening, local media have reported.

An unidentified gunman opened fire with a Kalashnikov rifle in the lobby of the Federal Security Services (FSB) building before fleeing the scene, the RBC news website cited an police source as saying.

The 112 Telegram channel reports that three members of the security services were killed in the shooting according to prelimenary information.

A video of the incident depicts people fleeing the scene with gunfire heard in the background.

The streets around the site have been blocked off.

The Baza Telegram channel reports that there were three shooters, two of whom have been killed. One shooter has reportedly escaped to a parking lot near the FSB building and is being pursued by security forces.

The FSB has announced that there was one shooter and he has been killed, Russian media have reported.

The shooting took place on the eve of Russia's Day of Security Forces, celebrated Dec. 20. President Vladimir Putin was attending a concert on Thursday evening dedicated to the holiday at the Grand Kremlin Palace.
 
The Lubyanka Shooting Is a Familiar Story

1577074558364.png

The story of the Lubyanka shooter, the man who embarked on what must have been a suicide mission in the heart of Moscow, is still unrolling, and one minute’s consensus can easily become old news the next. We will no doubt learn much more about Evgeny Manyurov and his possible motivation, but in the meantime one aspect of the case which struck me, while fielding numerous press queries, was how far they often reflected a continuing gap between the images of Russia so many outside journalists still have and the realities on the ground.

What follows will likely not surprise any readers who know Russia through their own experiences, and is certainly not directed at the excellent corps of journalists in Moscow, both Russian and foreign. It is, perhaps, more a very small-scale ethnography of a still-common Moscow of the mind and of the meme.

1. The Lubyanka is not a fortress. As anyone who has walked past its façade knows, the Lubyanka is distinctly light on armed guards at the doors, gates and secure perimeters. There are the by now ubiquitous blocks there to prevent the building being rammed by a vehicle, and always a distinct density of DPS traffic police who might not be traffic police after all, but otherwise there is nothing to prevent anyone entering. Even when artist and political activist Petr Pavlensky set light to one of the Lubyanka’s doors one night in 2015, all they did was fit a new door. In this respect it is more like MI5’s Thames House headquarters than MI6’s rather more showy Vauxhall Cross building, enclosed as it is within a cage of bars, gates, cameras and armed guards.

Of course, go beyond the doors and the anteroom within is where the real perimeter security begins, as Manyurov apparently discovered. Whether because it can rely on its formidable reputation — this was a building in which, back in the darkest Soviet days, “enemies of the people” were tortured to death in its basements, or gunned down in its courtyard – or to make a point about being part of the nation, the FSB, like the KGB, does not hide from view.

2. Not all Russian terrorism is jihadist, and not all jihadists are from the North Caucasus. Perhaps the most depressing press inquiry I fielded — I’ll spare the journalist’s blushes and keep them anonymous — was when Manyurov’s name was already being circulated, along with the suggestion that as his father’s name is Fatih, he was of part-Tatar extraction. Along with claims (so far unconfirmed) that he had shouted Islamist slogans during the attack, the journalist was assuming this was a jihadist incident, but was confused: “but he doesn’t have the beard.”

“The beard.” Oh dear.

Of course, there have been serious terrorist attacks from the North Caucasus and, yes, many of them have big beards. But of late, just as serious a challenge has come from radicalized Muslims from Central Asia such as the 2017 St. Petersburg metro attack. Furthermore, as in the West, terrorist attacks from other quarters are a serious but often neglected problem. The closest parallel to the Lubyanka attack was, after all, in 2017, when a lone gunman shot and killed two people in an attack on the FSB HQ in Khabarovsk; he was a neo-Nazi.

3. The Russian security forces are not all thugs and cowards. Admittedly this is much more a theme one will encounter on social media, but in the modern information era that also bleeds into the assumptions of non-specialist journalists.

The fact that this incident was locked down pretty quickly, that civilian deaths were averted, and that police officers rushed to the scene without waiting for specialist armed-response units seems to have taken some people by surprise.

Although it is certainly true that Russian rules of engagement can be more permissive than those of many other services – although more people die from police bullets in the USA than Russia — and there are serious problems of violence, corruption and abuses, but nonetheless I have been struck by similarities more that differences between police of various nations. Whatever the uniform or even the system, to a considerable extent, a cop is a cop, regardless.

In short, for an admitted minority of journalists — but a far larger minority than I honestly would have expected – their assumptions of this story has been as much driven by expressions of Orientalism, the relentless ‘othering’ of countries such as Russia, exaggerating and concentrating on real and assumed cultural differences.

This case is clearly a tragedy, for the victims, for Manyurov’s family and even for Manyurov himself – no one was born wanting to die in a suicidal attack — but also a strikingly familiar one. A man who appears to have been as unlucky in love as in business; a loner still living with his mother; a failure in life fascinated by guns, presumably for the sense of near-magical power they conveyed on the chronically powerless. Sometimes such “lone wolves” — an unfortunate phrase as it conveys a degree of feral glamour – gravitate to religious causes, sometimes political ones, sometimes incoherent conspiracy theory-fuelled paranoias.

The shooter may have been a Russian, wielding a Russian gun, targeting a Russian institution, but the story is a universal one. This, as much as anything else, ought to remind governments in Moscow and the West that they need to go beyond their empty platitudes about deep cooperation against terrorism, and actually revive this area of common interest.
 
Ukraine and Russia Can Deal When They Must But Peace Isn’t Close

1578005125775.png

Quickfire agreements on energy and the Kremlin-backed war that erupted after Vladimir Putin annexed Crimea show Ukraine and Russia can increasingly look past their differences to strike deals.

The natural-gas pact agreed late Monday, which ended fears of disruptions to European Union supplies, comes a day after the former allies’ second prisoner swap in four months. EU diplomats, mediating in both cases, may feel they’re making headway in easing tensions more than five years after the conflict in eastern Ukraine rekindled Cold War animosity and brought a barrage of sanctions against Russia.

That Ukraine and Russia now meet at all — let alone reach consensus on hot-button issues like these — marks undoubted progress. It’s been driven by pragmatism and a readiness to compromise under EU and U.S. pressure, including the Trump administration’s sanctions against Russia’s Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project.

The gas deal was necessary as transit contracts ran down. Putin wants sanctions relief and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has prioritized ending a war that’s killed more than 13,000 people.

The fundamental question -- whether Ukraine leans east or west — is going nowhere without concessions regarded as impossible by one side or another. The standoff with Moscow over Ukraine’s desire to join the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will remain a headache for world powers from Brussels to Washington.

“The events of the past several years have created significant changes in how the two governments and their people relate to one another, and to the rest of Europe,” said Alex Brideau, an analyst at Eurasia Group. “Recent developments help ease tension, but they don’t reset that relationship.”

The EU will nevertheless breathe a sigh of relief after the accord was signed to ensure flows of gas through Ukraine from Russia’s Gazprom for the next five years. Supplies to the region have been cut twice during in the past 13 years at times of peak demand because of financial and political disputes between the two neighboring states.

Russia, keen to take advantage of French President Emmanuel Macron’s push to reintegrate it after years of isolation, has less incentive to cause mayhem this time. But it retains its long-term goal of seeking to slash dependence on Ukraine’s transit network.

That Russia agreed to a longer-than-expected gas deal this time reflects potential fallout from the U.S. sanctioning its Nord Stream 2 pipeline to send flows directly to Europe bypassing Ukraine rather than any act of kindness. For Zelenskiy, it ensures Ukraine remains one of the key transit routes for Russian gas during the remainder of his five-year term and beyond, earning the country billions of dollars in fees.

Still, the fact an initial deadline to finalize the deal was missed stems from a lack of trust that prompted demands for safeguards to be added to the new contracts.

There are similar reasons to scrutinize the exchange of prisoners.

Despite efforts to return all his countrymen, Zelenskiy remains frustrated, with hundreds still being held.

What’s more, the latest swap included Ukrainian riot police who sided with the Kremlin-backed leader that protesters toppled in 2014 after more than 100 were killed on the streets of Kiev. Handing over those officers, who aren’t prisoners of war, prompted demonstrations against their release back home.

The gas agreement and the prisoner swap cap a month in which Putin and Zelenskiy held their first face-to-face meeting during talks on the conflict in eastern Ukraine in Paris. While the detente remains fragile, the two sides enter 2020 with potentially the best prospects in years for easing tensions.

Putin and Zelenskiy spoke by phone on Tuesday and agreed to coordinate lists of detainees for possible future exchanges, according to a statement from the Ukrainian president’s office. The gas agreement creates a “favorable atmosphere for resolving other bilateral problems” and the Dec. 29 prisoner swap “helps strengthen mutual trust,” the Kremlin said in a statement.

There may be more prisoner exchanges, though “I do not think we will see real compromises on big issues” from Russia in relation to resolving the conflict, said John Herbst, director of the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a former U.S. ambassador to Ukraine.
 
Russia Is Reverting to Stalinist Patterns

1578075141138.png

This year started off quiet. Things were calm until June, when the authorities arrested Meduza journalist Ivan Golunov. Then, from August onward, they snatched up one person after another following the Moscow protests. Now, as December ends, the country is witnessing trials of political prisoners nearly every day.

What is most surprising is how Russians, after having been dealt such a rotten hand by the authorities has found the strength to go on winter vacation. This forces us to abstain from reporting on the trials of innocent people for two weeks as the prosecutors and various arbiters of fate celebrate the New Year in style. Then, with renewed strength, the state will continue putting people of conscience through its meat grinder of a justice system — a sign of what awaits Russia in the 2020s.

Some might say we devote too much attention to political prisoners. They might argue that Russia has plenty of other more pressing problems to worry about, from garbage to poverty, from corruption to inequality.

And compared to what happened in this country in the 20th century, the scale of today’s political persecution — involving only several dozen individuals — is modest.

Cynics might add that the sentences handed down are only minor irritants when compared to the draconian measures of the past. This is all true, and yet, political terror has the peculiar quality of making everyone in the country who ignores the problem — out of a desire to simply get on with their lives — accomplices to the crime.

The repressive apparatus and the all-powerful state are enabled by the masses who agree to avert their gaze at the necessary moment.

That sort of conformism is understandable and even excusable. After all, nobody is required to play the hero.

But the cynicism of the Russian courts, that publicly claim white is actually black, give a veneer of legality to all such illicit doings. If it is possible to imprison a person who has committed no crimes, and do so with the whole world looking on, they why not turn the remote town of Shies into Russia’s landfill, siphon money from the federal budget, and falsify the results of elections?

The conformists have already learned to turn a blind eye to such things, and will continue to do as needed in the future.

This year, I saw people being beaten on the streets, hordes of security forces paralyzing life in Moscow with their uniformed police cordons, and judges looking away as they delivered their blindly obedient verdicts against innocent defendants.

But even against this backdrop, it was the willingness of ordinary people to simply accept these new game rules that made the most profound impression.

Do you teach at a university? Then don’t express your opinion about the latest news. Was your colleague fired because he or she did not remain silent at the necessary moment? Then keep your head down and work on publishing an academic article instead.

Do you work in the theater? Then make sure that nothing that could be construed as criticism of the ruling authorities ever appears onstage. Don’t you realize that, at this critical juncture for Russia, the people need to be unusually careful?

Most of our contemporaries did not live through the Stalin era, and many are too young to remember former Soviet leader Yury Andropov.

However, when dark political clouds appear on the horizon, the Russian people almost instinctively begin marching in lockstep to their collective doom. To acknowledge that political catastrophe unfolding in this country is to risk your career, standing in society, and possibly, your personal freedom.

This catastrophe is so obvious that real effort is required to pretend nothing is wrong. A future generation of historians and anthropologists might be baffled as to how a chilling collective silence descended not once, but twice in the very same country.

Only those who refuse to fear speak their minds. They are the best of the 20-somethings, those who stand alone against an impenetrable phalanx of security officers, latter-day Komsomols, and corrupt officials. Which side will control this country in the 2020s?
 
1579921371001.png


An astonishingly wide-ranging history of Russian nationalism chronicling Russia's yearning for Empire and how it has affected its politics for centuries from the author of Chernobyl, winner of the Baillie Gifford Prize

In 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and attempted to seize a portion of Ukraine. While the world watched in outrage, this violation of national sovereignty was in fact only the latest iteration of a centuries-long effort to expand Russian boundaries and create a pan-Russian nation. In Lost Kingdom, award-winning historian
Serhii Plokhy argues that we can only understand the merging of imperialism and nationalism in Russia today by delving into its history.

Spanning over two thousand years, from the end of the Mongol rule to the present day, Plokhy shows how leaders from Ivan the Terrible to Joseph Stalin to Vladimir Putin have exploited existing forms of identity, warfare and territorial expansion to achieve imperial supremacy. A strikingly ambitious book, Lost Kingdom chronicles the long and belligerent history of Russia's empire and nation-building quest.

1579921622832.png


'Brisk and thoughtful, this book could hardly be more timely'
Dominic Sandbrook, BBC History Magazine, Books of the Year


432 pagina's is nog vrij beknopt. (want... incl. noten, bibliografie & index)
 
Laatst bewerkt:
Back
Naar boven