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ook al zijn het er niet veel meer..dr zal altijd wel een kleine groep aanhangers zijn die niet te beroerd zijn om een aanslag te plegen om hem te wreken
Saddam Hussein krijgt de doodstraf
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ook al zijn het er niet veel meer..dr zal altijd wel een kleine groep aanhangers zijn die niet te beroerd zijn om een aanslag te plegen om hem te wreken
Dat is zeker. Maar ik hoop dat het land snel genoeg stabieler wordt zodat diegenen die er aan denken om terug een aanslag te plegen in zijn naam het nut er niet meer van zullen inzien en dus afhaken.
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marshall hulp again?
gaat ze wss meer opleveren dan al het geld wat ze er nu aan militairen hebben zitten.
Maar jammergenoeg is de kans op aanslagen groot en ik zie het nog niet echt gebeuren dat die direct ophouden eigenlijk...
Nou ja, verdeel en heers zullen de Ami's wellen denken. Maar die oorlog kost ze klauwen met geld, dus ze moeten er wel een keer mee kappen, alhoewel een afsluiting van die olie ze nog meer zou kosten waarschijnlijk.
gaat ze wss meer opleveren dan al het geld wat ze er nu aan militairen hebben zitten.
Maar jammergenoeg is de kans op aanslagen groot en ik zie het nog niet echt gebeuren dat die direct ophouden eigenlijk...
Nou ja, verdeel en heers zullen de Ami's wellen denken. Maar die oorlog kost ze klauwen met geld, dus ze moeten er wel een keer mee kappen, alhoewel een afsluiting van die olie ze nog meer zou kosten waarschijnlijk.
Ik zag iets grappigs op tv:
Amerikaanse burger: yeah but he said we would be able to use the oil to pay for the war in Irak. And now we are loosing money overthere. What a waste!
Je ziet, het patriottisme heeft soms vreemde gevolgen. De doorsnee Amerikaan die voor de inval was, was dat niet omdat hij vond dat het Iraksese volk lijdde en moest gered worden. Neen ze dachten aan 50 cents a gallon.
Maar dat compleet terzijde en off topic.
MuscleBear
Ripped Bodybuilder
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Hij moet nog terecht staan voor 2 andere feiten, die nog erger zijn dan de misdaad waar hij reeds voor is veroordeeld.
Maar als het vonnis wordt uitgevoerd zullen deze feiten niet kunnen behandeld worden.
Het gaat om de moord op 180 000 koerden en een gifgasaanval (als ik me niet vergis). Wat zou de reden zijn dat men eerst deze zaak heeft behandeld en nu pas aan de volgende twee zal beginnen? Waarom is men niet eerst aan de gifgasaanval of de moord op de koerden begonnen? Zou dit een politieke reden kunnen hebben?
Of dacht men: "deze eerste zaak zal het makkelijkste zijn om hem ter dood te veroordelen. Eens hij dus weet dat hij er aan gaat, zal hij minder van zich afbijten bij de volgende rechtzaken." Zou dat een reden kunnen zijn?
Zou men hem zo snel mogelijk willen veroordelen zodat de moord op de koerden en de gifgasaanval niet ten gronde zou kunnen behandeld worden? Zou het mogelijk zijn dat men tracht stinkende potjes dicht te houden? Kent er iemand de rol van andere landen in dit hele verhaal? Bijvoorbeeld: waar haalde Saddam de gifgas vandaan? Hoe vermoorde hij de Koerden en welk ander land vond dat politiek interessant (ik denk dan bijv aan Turkije)?
Zo een paar bedenkingen waar ik graag wat dieper zou op ingaan.
Maar als het vonnis wordt uitgevoerd zullen deze feiten niet kunnen behandeld worden.
Het gaat om de moord op 180 000 koerden en een gifgasaanval (als ik me niet vergis). Wat zou de reden zijn dat men eerst deze zaak heeft behandeld en nu pas aan de volgende twee zal beginnen? Waarom is men niet eerst aan de gifgasaanval of de moord op de koerden begonnen? Zou dit een politieke reden kunnen hebben?
Of dacht men: "deze eerste zaak zal het makkelijkste zijn om hem ter dood te veroordelen. Eens hij dus weet dat hij er aan gaat, zal hij minder van zich afbijten bij de volgende rechtzaken." Zou dat een reden kunnen zijn?
Zou men hem zo snel mogelijk willen veroordelen zodat de moord op de koerden en de gifgasaanval niet ten gronde zou kunnen behandeld worden? Zou het mogelijk zijn dat men tracht stinkende potjes dicht te houden? Kent er iemand de rol van andere landen in dit hele verhaal? Bijvoorbeeld: waar haalde Saddam de gifgas vandaan? Hoe vermoorde hij de Koerden en welk ander land vond dat politiek interessant (ik denk dan bijv aan Turkije)?
Zo een paar bedenkingen waar ik graag wat dieper zou op ingaan.
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ik vond:
"The new case involves Saddam's role in Operation Anfal, a three-phase move against Kurds in northern Iraq during the war with Iran in the late 1980s. Anfal included the March 16 gas attack on the village of Halabja in which 5,000 people, including women and children, died. "
en ook
"In December, a Dutch court sentenced chemicals merchant Frans van Anraat to 15 years in prison for selling Saddam's regime the chemicals used in the gas attacks. The ruling, the first ever dealing with atrocities under Saddam, concluded that the attacks constituted genocide. "
en ook:
"Almost all current accounts of the incident regard Iraq as the party responsible for the gas attack, which occurred during the Iran-Iraq War. The war between Iran and Iraq was in its eighth year when, on March 16 and 17, 1988, Iraq dropped poison gas on the Kurdish city of Halabja, then held by Iranian troops and Iraqi Kurdish guerrillas allied with Tehran; throughout the war, Iran had supplied the Iraqi Kurdish rebels with safe haven and other military support."
zou het kunnen, aangezien Amerika de oorlog tegen Iran steunde, dat men Saddam toeliet om de koerden in dat dorp te vergassen omdat ze mss dachten dat het rebellen waren die Iran steunden?
Amerika steunde de oorlog tegen Iran en gaf Saddam de nodige wapens. Zou Amerika reeds geweten hebben dat de gifgasaanal zou plaatsvinden maar hebben ze een oogje dicht gedaan om dat ze sadddam steunden? Het is maar een hypothese die zonde bewijs weinig waarde heeft; Maar het is een denkpiste die het volgens mij waard is te onderzoeken.
interessant:
In warning against a possible Iraqi chemical or biological strike against U.S. troops, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld remarked last week that "there's a danger that Saddam Hussein would do things he's done previously — he has in the past used chemical weapons."
.
Rumsfeld should know. Declassified State Department documents show that when he had an opportunity to raise the issue of chemical weapons with the Iraqi leadership in 1983, he failed to do so in any meaningful way. Worse, he may well have given a signal to the Iraqis that the United States would close its eyes to Iraq's use of chemical weapons during its war with Iran, providing an early boost to Iraq's plans to develop weapons of mass destruction..
As President Ronald Reagan's special envoy for the Middle East, Rumsfeld in December 1983 made the first visit by a U.S. official of his seniority to Baghdad, where he met President Saddam Hussein and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Iraq had broken off diplomatic relations with the United States in June 1967. Now both sides hoped that the talks in Baghdad would facilitate a resumption of formal ties.
.
The visit came at a time when Iraq was facing Iranian "human wave" assaults that posed a serious threat to the regime. In response, Iraq had started to use chemical weapons on the battlefield — primarily mustard gas, a blister agent that can kill. This was known in Washington at least as early as October 1983. State Department officials had raised the alarm, suggesting ways of deterring further Iraqi use..
But they faced resistance. Washington, while taking a formal position of neutrality in the Gulf conflict, had started a pronounced tilt toward Iraq, providing it with significant financial and political support.
.
As talking points and minutes of the meetings show, the aim of Rumsfeld's mission was to inform the Iraqi leadership of America's shifting policy in the Middle East. It was also intended to explore a proposal to run an oil pipeline from Iraq to the Jordanian port of Aqaba (a U.S. business interest involving the Bechtel Corporation), and to caution the Iraqis not to escalate the war in the Gulf through air strikes against Iranian oil facilities and tankers (which Washington feared might draw the United States into the war)..
There is no indication that Rumsfeld raised U.S. concerns about Iraq's use of poison gas with Saddam Hussein. But in a private meeting with Tariq Aziz, he made a single brief reference to "certain things" that made it difficult for the United States to do more to help Iraq. These things included "chemical weapons, possible escalation in the Gulf, and human rights."
.
There is no record of further discussion of chemical weapons or human rights at these meetings, which covered the length and breadth of the warming relationship. Rumsfeld did, however, place considerable emphasis on the need for Iraq to prevent an escalation in the Gulf conflict via attacks on Iranian oil installations and tankers. Certainly nothing suggests that he told the Iraqi leadership to take care of "certain things" before diplomatic relations could be restored.
.
The senior U.S. diplomat in Baghdad reported a few days later with evident delight that "Ambassador Rumsfeld's visit has elevated U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new level." But, he noted, "during and following the Rumsfeld visit we have received no commitment from the Iraqis that they will refrain from military moves toward escalation in the Gulf."
.
The record of the war suggests that, flush with their new confidence in U.S. backing, the Iraqis may have felt that they were now less restrained. They attacked Iranian oil facilities and ended up drawing the United States into the war, in 1987.
.
In the first Iranian offensive after Rumsfeld's visit, in February 1984, Iraq used not only large amounts of mustard gas but also the highly lethal nerve agent tabun. It was the first recorded use of the nerve agent in history. In November 1984, shortly after Reagan's re-election, diplomatic relations between the Washington and Baghdad were restored.
.
Iraq made increasing use of chemical weapons on the battlefield and even against civilians. This culminated in the wholesale gassing of the Kurdish town of Halabja in March 1988, causing the deaths of several thousand innocent men, women, and children..
Eventually Iraq was able to force a cease-fire with Iran after eight years of fighting.
.
The American public should demand a full accounting for the support its leadership provided Iraq in the past, including its green light to chemical weapons use — weapons that Washington is belatedly claiming should be destroyed.
.
*
.
The writer, Middle East project director for the International Crisis Group, is preparing a book on U.S. policy toward Iraq, with partial support from the Open Society Institute and the MacArthur Foundation. He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.
.
[Not to be reproduced without the permission of the author.] CORRECTION PUBLISHED IN THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE DATED Saturday, November 30, 2002:
.
The article "Who minded Iraqi mustard gas in 1983?" (Views, Nov. 29) was a personal comment by Joost R. Hiltermann and was not written in his capacity as Middle East project director for the International Crisis Group.
.
"The new case involves Saddam's role in Operation Anfal, a three-phase move against Kurds in northern Iraq during the war with Iran in the late 1980s. Anfal included the March 16 gas attack on the village of Halabja in which 5,000 people, including women and children, died. "
en ook
"In December, a Dutch court sentenced chemicals merchant Frans van Anraat to 15 years in prison for selling Saddam's regime the chemicals used in the gas attacks. The ruling, the first ever dealing with atrocities under Saddam, concluded that the attacks constituted genocide. "
en ook:
"Almost all current accounts of the incident regard Iraq as the party responsible for the gas attack, which occurred during the Iran-Iraq War. The war between Iran and Iraq was in its eighth year when, on March 16 and 17, 1988, Iraq dropped poison gas on the Kurdish city of Halabja, then held by Iranian troops and Iraqi Kurdish guerrillas allied with Tehran; throughout the war, Iran had supplied the Iraqi Kurdish rebels with safe haven and other military support."
zou het kunnen, aangezien Amerika de oorlog tegen Iran steunde, dat men Saddam toeliet om de koerden in dat dorp te vergassen omdat ze mss dachten dat het rebellen waren die Iran steunden?
Amerika steunde de oorlog tegen Iran en gaf Saddam de nodige wapens. Zou Amerika reeds geweten hebben dat de gifgasaanal zou plaatsvinden maar hebben ze een oogje dicht gedaan om dat ze sadddam steunden? Het is maar een hypothese die zonde bewijs weinig waarde heeft; Maar het is een denkpiste die het volgens mij waard is te onderzoeken.
interessant:
In warning against a possible Iraqi chemical or biological strike against U.S. troops, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld remarked last week that "there's a danger that Saddam Hussein would do things he's done previously — he has in the past used chemical weapons."
.
Rumsfeld should know. Declassified State Department documents show that when he had an opportunity to raise the issue of chemical weapons with the Iraqi leadership in 1983, he failed to do so in any meaningful way. Worse, he may well have given a signal to the Iraqis that the United States would close its eyes to Iraq's use of chemical weapons during its war with Iran, providing an early boost to Iraq's plans to develop weapons of mass destruction..
As President Ronald Reagan's special envoy for the Middle East, Rumsfeld in December 1983 made the first visit by a U.S. official of his seniority to Baghdad, where he met President Saddam Hussein and Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Iraq had broken off diplomatic relations with the United States in June 1967. Now both sides hoped that the talks in Baghdad would facilitate a resumption of formal ties.
.
The visit came at a time when Iraq was facing Iranian "human wave" assaults that posed a serious threat to the regime. In response, Iraq had started to use chemical weapons on the battlefield — primarily mustard gas, a blister agent that can kill. This was known in Washington at least as early as October 1983. State Department officials had raised the alarm, suggesting ways of deterring further Iraqi use..
But they faced resistance. Washington, while taking a formal position of neutrality in the Gulf conflict, had started a pronounced tilt toward Iraq, providing it with significant financial and political support.
.
As talking points and minutes of the meetings show, the aim of Rumsfeld's mission was to inform the Iraqi leadership of America's shifting policy in the Middle East. It was also intended to explore a proposal to run an oil pipeline from Iraq to the Jordanian port of Aqaba (a U.S. business interest involving the Bechtel Corporation), and to caution the Iraqis not to escalate the war in the Gulf through air strikes against Iranian oil facilities and tankers (which Washington feared might draw the United States into the war)..
There is no indication that Rumsfeld raised U.S. concerns about Iraq's use of poison gas with Saddam Hussein. But in a private meeting with Tariq Aziz, he made a single brief reference to "certain things" that made it difficult for the United States to do more to help Iraq. These things included "chemical weapons, possible escalation in the Gulf, and human rights."
.
There is no record of further discussion of chemical weapons or human rights at these meetings, which covered the length and breadth of the warming relationship. Rumsfeld did, however, place considerable emphasis on the need for Iraq to prevent an escalation in the Gulf conflict via attacks on Iranian oil installations and tankers. Certainly nothing suggests that he told the Iraqi leadership to take care of "certain things" before diplomatic relations could be restored.
.
The senior U.S. diplomat in Baghdad reported a few days later with evident delight that "Ambassador Rumsfeld's visit has elevated U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new level." But, he noted, "during and following the Rumsfeld visit we have received no commitment from the Iraqis that they will refrain from military moves toward escalation in the Gulf."
.
The record of the war suggests that, flush with their new confidence in U.S. backing, the Iraqis may have felt that they were now less restrained. They attacked Iranian oil facilities and ended up drawing the United States into the war, in 1987.
.
In the first Iranian offensive after Rumsfeld's visit, in February 1984, Iraq used not only large amounts of mustard gas but also the highly lethal nerve agent tabun. It was the first recorded use of the nerve agent in history. In November 1984, shortly after Reagan's re-election, diplomatic relations between the Washington and Baghdad were restored.
.
Iraq made increasing use of chemical weapons on the battlefield and even against civilians. This culminated in the wholesale gassing of the Kurdish town of Halabja in March 1988, causing the deaths of several thousand innocent men, women, and children..
Eventually Iraq was able to force a cease-fire with Iran after eight years of fighting.
.
The American public should demand a full accounting for the support its leadership provided Iraq in the past, including its green light to chemical weapons use — weapons that Washington is belatedly claiming should be destroyed.
.
*
.
The writer, Middle East project director for the International Crisis Group, is preparing a book on U.S. policy toward Iraq, with partial support from the Open Society Institute and the MacArthur Foundation. He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.
.
[Not to be reproduced without the permission of the author.] CORRECTION PUBLISHED IN THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE DATED Saturday, November 30, 2002:
.
The article "Who minded Iraqi mustard gas in 1983?" (Views, Nov. 29) was a personal comment by Joost R. Hiltermann and was not written in his capacity as Middle East project director for the International Crisis Group.
.
En voor wie echt in detail wil gaan en de "propere handen van Amerika' wil zien in dze hele affaire omtrent de gifgas, moet dit maar eens lezen. het is lang maar ik zal de schokkende stukken vet zetten:
1982
Despite intelligence reports that Iraq still sponsored groups on the SD's terrorist list, and "apparently without consulting Congress", the Reagan Administration removed Iraq from the State terrorism sponsorship list in 1982.[3] The removal made Iraq eligible for U.S. dual-use and military technology.[4] 1983
Dus men haalde ze van de lijst zodat men ze wapens kon verkopen, terwijl men wist dat Irak terroristische groepen steunden!
A SD report concluded that Iraq continued to support groups on the SD’s terrorist list.[5]
Iraq reportedly began using chemical weapons (CW) against Iranian troops in 1982, and significantly increased CW use in 1983. Reagan’s Secretary of State, George Shultz, said that reports of Iraq using CWs on Iranian military personnel "drifted in" at the year’s end.[6] A declassified CIA report, probably written in late 1987, notes Iraq's use of mustard gas in August 1983, giving further credence to the suggestion that the SD and/or National Security Council (NSC) was well aware of Iraq's use of CW at this time.[7]
Analysts recognized that "civilian" helicopters can be weaponized in a matter of hours and selling a civilian kit can be a way of giving military aid under the guise of civilian assistance.[8] Shortly after removing Iraq from the terrorism sponsorship list, the Reagan administration approved the sale of 60 Hughes helicopters.[9] Later, and despite some objections from the National Security Council (NSC), the Secretaries of Commerce and State (George Baldridge and George Shultz) lobbied the NSC advisor into agreeing to the sale to Iraq of 10 Bell helicopters,[10] officially for crop spraying. See "1988" for note on Iraq using U.S. Helicopters to spray Kurds with chemical weapons.
Dus men verkocht ze helicopters waarvan ze wisten ( ze hadden er speciaal een rapport over gecchreven) en men wist dat deze helicopters makkelijk konden aangepast worden om de Koerden mee te besproeien.)
Later in the year the Reagan Administration secretly began to allow Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt to transfer to Iraq U.S. howitzers, helicopters, bombs and other weapons.[11] Reagan personally asked Italy’s Prime Minister Guilio Andreotti to channel arms to Iraq.[12]
1984
The SD announced on 6 March that, based on "available evidence," it "concluded" that Iraq used "lethal chemical weapons" (specifically mustard gas) in fresh fighting with Iran.[13] On 20 March, U.S. intelligence officials said that they had "what they believe to be incontrovertible evidence that Iraq has used nerve gas in its war with Iran and has almost finished extensive sites for mass-producing the lethal chemical warfare agent".[14]
ze waren dus goed op de hoogte maar lieten begaan omdat ze Iran wouden verslaan.
European-based doctors examined Iranian troops in March 1984 and confirmed exposure to mustard gas.[15] The UN sent expert missions to the battle region in March 1984, February/March 1986, April/May 1987, March/April 1988, July 1988 (twice), and mid-August 1988. These missions detailed and documented Iraq’s CW use.[16]
According to the Washington Post, the CIA began in 1984 secretly to give Iraq intelligence that Iraq uses to "calibrate" its mustard gas attacks on Iranian troops. In August, the CIA establishes a direct Washington-Baghdad intelligence link, and for 18 months, starting in early 1985, the CIA provided Iraq with "data from sensitive U.S. satellite reconnaissance photography...to assist Iraqi bombing raids." The Post’s source said that this data was essential to Iraq’s war effort.[17]
The United States re-established full diplomatic ties with Iraq on 26 November,[18] just over a year after Iraq’s first well-publicized CW use and only 8 months after the UN and U.S. reported that Iraq used CWs on Iranian troops. 1985
In 1985 the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill to put Iraq back on the State terrorism sponsorship list.[19] After the bill’s passage, Shultz wrote to the bill’s sponsor, Rep. Howard Berman, cited the U.S.’ "diplomatic dialogue on this and other sensitive issues, " claimed that "Iraq has effectively distanced itself from international terrorism," and stated that if the U.S. found that Iraq supports groups practicing terrorism "we would promptly return Iraq to the list."[20] Rep. Berman dropped the bill and explicitly cited Shultz’s assurances.[21]
Men kwam dus van hogerhand actief tussenbeide om Irak niet terug op de lijst te plaatsen terwijl er toch genoeg bewijs was.
Iraq’s Saad 16 General Establishment’s director wrote a letter to the Commerce Department (CD) detailing the activities in Saad’s 70 laboratories. These activities had the trademarks of ballistic missile development.[22]
1986
The Defense Department’s (DOD) Under Secretary for Trade Security Policy, Stephen Bryen, informed the Commerce Department’s (CD) Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration in November that intelligence linked the Saad 16 research center with ballistic missile development.[23] Between 1985 and 1990, CD approved many computer sales to Iraq that go directly to Saad 16. CD approved over $1 million worth of computer equipment for sale to Saad 16 after Commerce received the above-mentioned November letter from DOD.[24] As of 1991 Saad 16 reportedly contained up to 40% U.S.-origin equipment.[25]
1988
The CD approved exports in January and February to Iraq’s SCUD missile program’s procurement agency. These exports allowed Iraq to extend SCUD range far enough to hit allied soldiers in Saudi Arabia and Israeli civilians in Tel Aviv and Haifa.[26]
On 23 March, London’s Financial Times and several other news organizations reported from Halabja, located in Iraqi Kurdistan, that several days prior Iraq used CWs on Halabja’s Kurds.[27]
In May, two months after the Halabja assault, Peter Burleigh, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of northern Gulf affairs, encouraged U.S.-Iraqi corporate cooperation at a symposium hosted by the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum. The U.S.-Iraq Business Forum had strong (albeit unofficial) ties to the Iraqi government.[28]
Dus er was een rapport dat Irak de koerden had vergast maar toch ging men een maand later de US-Irak -relatie aanmoedigen en versterken, om financiele redenen.
The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee sent a team to Turkey to speak to Iraqi Kurdish refugees and assess reports that Iraq "was using chemical weapons on its Kurdish population."[29] This report reaffirmed that between 1984 and 1988 "Iraq repeatedly and effectively used poison gas on Iran," the UN missions’ findings, and the chemical attack on Halabja that left an estimated 4,000 people dead.[30]
Following the Halabja attack and Iraq’s August CW offensive against Iraqi Kurds, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed on 8 September the "Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988" the day after it is introduced.[31] The act cuts off from Iraq U.S. loans, military and non-military assistance, credits, credit guarantees, items subject to export controls, and U.S. imports of Iraqi oil.[32]
Immediately after the bill’s passage the Reagan Administration announced its opposition to the bill,[33] and SD spokesman Charles Redman called the bill "premature".[34] The Administration works with House opponents to a House companion bill, and after numerous legislation compromises and end-of-session haggling, the Senate bill died "on the last day of the legislative session".[35]
Dus men vond het erg dat de Koeden vergast waren en men wou Stppen met de relatie met Irak maar Reagan en zijn administratie kwamen tussenbeide om het wetsontwerp tegen te houden. Reagan is dus even verantwoordelijk als Saddam!
According to a 15 September news report, Reagan Administration officials stated that the U.S. intercepted Iraqi military communications marking Iraq’s CW attacks on Kurds.[36]
U.S. intelligence reported in 1991 that the U.S. helicopters sold to Iraq in 1983 were used in 1988 to spray Kurds with chemicals.[37]
"Reagan administration records show that between September and December 1988, 65 licenses were granted for dual-use technology exports. This averages out as an annual rate of 260 licenses, more than double the rate for January through August 1988."[38]
A general note about the Security Council's reaction to Iraq's CW use. Between 1984 and the implementation of the ceasefire on 20 August 1988 the UN Security Council passed six resolutions directly or indirectly related to the "situation between Iran and Iraq." In 1984, Security Council Resolution (SCR) 552 "condemns [Iran's] recent attack on commercial ship en route to and from ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia"[39] but it did not pass a resolution on the Iran-Iraq War generally or the UN expert mission's chemical weapons March findings specifically. During all of 1985 the Security Council did not pass a resolution on the "situation between Iran and Iraq" or Iraq's chemical weapons use therein. Although the UN's expert mission concluded in March 1986 that Iraq used chemical weapons on Iranian troops,[40] SCR 582 (1986) symmetrically noted "that both the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq are parties to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare signed at Geneva on 7 June 1925"[41] and "deplores...in particular the use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations under the 1925 Protocol".[42] Resolution 588 (1986) did not mention chemical weapons.[43] In 20 July 1987, SCR 598 again deplored "in particular the use chemical weapons contrary to obligations of the 1925 Protocol",[44] but does not elaborate. After considering the expert mission's 25 April 1988 report, the Security Council in Resolution 612 is "dismayed" by chemical weapons' continued use and "more intensive scale".[45] Furthermore, the Council "affirms the necessity that" both parties observe the 1925 Geneva Protocol, "condemns vigorously the continued use of chemical weapons" and "expects both sides to refrain from the future use of chemical weapons".[46] SCR 619 (1988) focused on implementing the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group and did not mention chemical weapons.[47] After the ceasefire, the Security Council considered the reports of the expert missions from 20-25 July and 2-19 August 1988 and stated in SCR 620 that it is "deeply dismayed" by the "continued use of chemical weapons" and that "such use against Iranians has become more intense and frequent".[48] Despite identifying Iranians as more frequent chemical weapons targets, the Security Council did not condemn Iraq. Rather, the Security Council "condemns resolutely the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq"[49]. All of the subsequent four resolutions, passed between 1989-1990 and relevant to "the situation between Iran and Iraq," pertained to the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group and as such omitted any reference to chemical weapons use.[50]
The Security Council could only condemn Iraq by name for using chemical weapons through non-binding Presidential statements, over which permanent members of the Security Council do not have an individual veto. On 21 March 1986, the Security Council President, making a "declaration" and "speaking on behalf of the Security Council," stated that the Council members are "profoundly concerned by the unanimous conclusion of the specialists that chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian troops...[and] the members of the Council strongly condemn this continued use of chemical weapons in clear violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use in war of chemical weapons".[51] The US voted against the issuance of this statement, and the UK, Australia, France and Denmark abstained. However, the concurring votes of the other ten members of the Security Council ensured that this statement constituted the first criticism of Iraq by the Security Council. A similar Presidential statement was made on 14 May 1987, which noted that the Council was "deeply dismayed" about the CW use against Iranian forces and civilians.
-------------------------------------
Conclusie? Maak ze zelf.
1982
Despite intelligence reports that Iraq still sponsored groups on the SD's terrorist list, and "apparently without consulting Congress", the Reagan Administration removed Iraq from the State terrorism sponsorship list in 1982.[3] The removal made Iraq eligible for U.S. dual-use and military technology.[4] 1983
Dus men haalde ze van de lijst zodat men ze wapens kon verkopen, terwijl men wist dat Irak terroristische groepen steunden!
A SD report concluded that Iraq continued to support groups on the SD’s terrorist list.[5]
Iraq reportedly began using chemical weapons (CW) against Iranian troops in 1982, and significantly increased CW use in 1983. Reagan’s Secretary of State, George Shultz, said that reports of Iraq using CWs on Iranian military personnel "drifted in" at the year’s end.[6] A declassified CIA report, probably written in late 1987, notes Iraq's use of mustard gas in August 1983, giving further credence to the suggestion that the SD and/or National Security Council (NSC) was well aware of Iraq's use of CW at this time.[7]
Analysts recognized that "civilian" helicopters can be weaponized in a matter of hours and selling a civilian kit can be a way of giving military aid under the guise of civilian assistance.[8] Shortly after removing Iraq from the terrorism sponsorship list, the Reagan administration approved the sale of 60 Hughes helicopters.[9] Later, and despite some objections from the National Security Council (NSC), the Secretaries of Commerce and State (George Baldridge and George Shultz) lobbied the NSC advisor into agreeing to the sale to Iraq of 10 Bell helicopters,[10] officially for crop spraying. See "1988" for note on Iraq using U.S. Helicopters to spray Kurds with chemical weapons.
Dus men verkocht ze helicopters waarvan ze wisten ( ze hadden er speciaal een rapport over gecchreven) en men wist dat deze helicopters makkelijk konden aangepast worden om de Koerden mee te besproeien.)
Later in the year the Reagan Administration secretly began to allow Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Egypt to transfer to Iraq U.S. howitzers, helicopters, bombs and other weapons.[11] Reagan personally asked Italy’s Prime Minister Guilio Andreotti to channel arms to Iraq.[12]
1984
The SD announced on 6 March that, based on "available evidence," it "concluded" that Iraq used "lethal chemical weapons" (specifically mustard gas) in fresh fighting with Iran.[13] On 20 March, U.S. intelligence officials said that they had "what they believe to be incontrovertible evidence that Iraq has used nerve gas in its war with Iran and has almost finished extensive sites for mass-producing the lethal chemical warfare agent".[14]
ze waren dus goed op de hoogte maar lieten begaan omdat ze Iran wouden verslaan.
European-based doctors examined Iranian troops in March 1984 and confirmed exposure to mustard gas.[15] The UN sent expert missions to the battle region in March 1984, February/March 1986, April/May 1987, March/April 1988, July 1988 (twice), and mid-August 1988. These missions detailed and documented Iraq’s CW use.[16]
According to the Washington Post, the CIA began in 1984 secretly to give Iraq intelligence that Iraq uses to "calibrate" its mustard gas attacks on Iranian troops. In August, the CIA establishes a direct Washington-Baghdad intelligence link, and for 18 months, starting in early 1985, the CIA provided Iraq with "data from sensitive U.S. satellite reconnaissance photography...to assist Iraqi bombing raids." The Post’s source said that this data was essential to Iraq’s war effort.[17]
The United States re-established full diplomatic ties with Iraq on 26 November,[18] just over a year after Iraq’s first well-publicized CW use and only 8 months after the UN and U.S. reported that Iraq used CWs on Iranian troops. 1985
In 1985 the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill to put Iraq back on the State terrorism sponsorship list.[19] After the bill’s passage, Shultz wrote to the bill’s sponsor, Rep. Howard Berman, cited the U.S.’ "diplomatic dialogue on this and other sensitive issues, " claimed that "Iraq has effectively distanced itself from international terrorism," and stated that if the U.S. found that Iraq supports groups practicing terrorism "we would promptly return Iraq to the list."[20] Rep. Berman dropped the bill and explicitly cited Shultz’s assurances.[21]
Men kwam dus van hogerhand actief tussenbeide om Irak niet terug op de lijst te plaatsen terwijl er toch genoeg bewijs was.
Iraq’s Saad 16 General Establishment’s director wrote a letter to the Commerce Department (CD) detailing the activities in Saad’s 70 laboratories. These activities had the trademarks of ballistic missile development.[22]
1986
The Defense Department’s (DOD) Under Secretary for Trade Security Policy, Stephen Bryen, informed the Commerce Department’s (CD) Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration in November that intelligence linked the Saad 16 research center with ballistic missile development.[23] Between 1985 and 1990, CD approved many computer sales to Iraq that go directly to Saad 16. CD approved over $1 million worth of computer equipment for sale to Saad 16 after Commerce received the above-mentioned November letter from DOD.[24] As of 1991 Saad 16 reportedly contained up to 40% U.S.-origin equipment.[25]
1988
The CD approved exports in January and February to Iraq’s SCUD missile program’s procurement agency. These exports allowed Iraq to extend SCUD range far enough to hit allied soldiers in Saudi Arabia and Israeli civilians in Tel Aviv and Haifa.[26]
On 23 March, London’s Financial Times and several other news organizations reported from Halabja, located in Iraqi Kurdistan, that several days prior Iraq used CWs on Halabja’s Kurds.[27]
In May, two months after the Halabja assault, Peter Burleigh, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of northern Gulf affairs, encouraged U.S.-Iraqi corporate cooperation at a symposium hosted by the U.S.-Iraq Business Forum. The U.S.-Iraq Business Forum had strong (albeit unofficial) ties to the Iraqi government.[28]
Dus er was een rapport dat Irak de koerden had vergast maar toch ging men een maand later de US-Irak -relatie aanmoedigen en versterken, om financiele redenen.
The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee sent a team to Turkey to speak to Iraqi Kurdish refugees and assess reports that Iraq "was using chemical weapons on its Kurdish population."[29] This report reaffirmed that between 1984 and 1988 "Iraq repeatedly and effectively used poison gas on Iran," the UN missions’ findings, and the chemical attack on Halabja that left an estimated 4,000 people dead.[30]
Following the Halabja attack and Iraq’s August CW offensive against Iraqi Kurds, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed on 8 September the "Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988" the day after it is introduced.[31] The act cuts off from Iraq U.S. loans, military and non-military assistance, credits, credit guarantees, items subject to export controls, and U.S. imports of Iraqi oil.[32]
Immediately after the bill’s passage the Reagan Administration announced its opposition to the bill,[33] and SD spokesman Charles Redman called the bill "premature".[34] The Administration works with House opponents to a House companion bill, and after numerous legislation compromises and end-of-session haggling, the Senate bill died "on the last day of the legislative session".[35]
Dus men vond het erg dat de Koeden vergast waren en men wou Stppen met de relatie met Irak maar Reagan en zijn administratie kwamen tussenbeide om het wetsontwerp tegen te houden. Reagan is dus even verantwoordelijk als Saddam!
According to a 15 September news report, Reagan Administration officials stated that the U.S. intercepted Iraqi military communications marking Iraq’s CW attacks on Kurds.[36]
U.S. intelligence reported in 1991 that the U.S. helicopters sold to Iraq in 1983 were used in 1988 to spray Kurds with chemicals.[37]
"Reagan administration records show that between September and December 1988, 65 licenses were granted for dual-use technology exports. This averages out as an annual rate of 260 licenses, more than double the rate for January through August 1988."[38]
A general note about the Security Council's reaction to Iraq's CW use. Between 1984 and the implementation of the ceasefire on 20 August 1988 the UN Security Council passed six resolutions directly or indirectly related to the "situation between Iran and Iraq." In 1984, Security Council Resolution (SCR) 552 "condemns [Iran's] recent attack on commercial ship en route to and from ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia"[39] but it did not pass a resolution on the Iran-Iraq War generally or the UN expert mission's chemical weapons March findings specifically. During all of 1985 the Security Council did not pass a resolution on the "situation between Iran and Iraq" or Iraq's chemical weapons use therein. Although the UN's expert mission concluded in March 1986 that Iraq used chemical weapons on Iranian troops,[40] SCR 582 (1986) symmetrically noted "that both the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq are parties to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous and Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare signed at Geneva on 7 June 1925"[41] and "deplores...in particular the use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations under the 1925 Protocol".[42] Resolution 588 (1986) did not mention chemical weapons.[43] In 20 July 1987, SCR 598 again deplored "in particular the use chemical weapons contrary to obligations of the 1925 Protocol",[44] but does not elaborate. After considering the expert mission's 25 April 1988 report, the Security Council in Resolution 612 is "dismayed" by chemical weapons' continued use and "more intensive scale".[45] Furthermore, the Council "affirms the necessity that" both parties observe the 1925 Geneva Protocol, "condemns vigorously the continued use of chemical weapons" and "expects both sides to refrain from the future use of chemical weapons".[46] SCR 619 (1988) focused on implementing the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group and did not mention chemical weapons.[47] After the ceasefire, the Security Council considered the reports of the expert missions from 20-25 July and 2-19 August 1988 and stated in SCR 620 that it is "deeply dismayed" by the "continued use of chemical weapons" and that "such use against Iranians has become more intense and frequent".[48] Despite identifying Iranians as more frequent chemical weapons targets, the Security Council did not condemn Iraq. Rather, the Security Council "condemns resolutely the use of chemical weapons in the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq"[49]. All of the subsequent four resolutions, passed between 1989-1990 and relevant to "the situation between Iran and Iraq," pertained to the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group and as such omitted any reference to chemical weapons use.[50]
The Security Council could only condemn Iraq by name for using chemical weapons through non-binding Presidential statements, over which permanent members of the Security Council do not have an individual veto. On 21 March 1986, the Security Council President, making a "declaration" and "speaking on behalf of the Security Council," stated that the Council members are "profoundly concerned by the unanimous conclusion of the specialists that chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi forces against Iranian troops...[and] the members of the Council strongly condemn this continued use of chemical weapons in clear violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which prohibits the use in war of chemical weapons".[51] The US voted against the issuance of this statement, and the UK, Australia, France and Denmark abstained. However, the concurring votes of the other ten members of the Security Council ensured that this statement constituted the first criticism of Iraq by the Security Council. A similar Presidential statement was made on 14 May 1987, which noted that the Council was "deeply dismayed" about the CW use against Iranian forces and civilians.
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Conclusie? Maak ze zelf.
